We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private bene…ts, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a tradeo¤ actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in a¤ecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.
Introduction
Human-driven climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions is an increasingly important driver of global environmental change associated with many potentially detrimental e¤ects. Despite serious attempts to obtain international cooperation in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), their concentration keeps increasing, suggesting that cooperation in mitigation has not been entirely successful. In fact there has been minimal political progress toward global cooperation in mitigating GHGs over the last 30 years.
Given the current path of global emissions of GHGs, their long atmospheric residence times and the relatively limited action to date to reduce future emissions, the use of geoengineering techniques has been proposed as an additional means to limit the magnitude and impact of human-induced climate change. Geoengineering is de…ned as a deliberate intervention in the planetary environment of a nature and scale intended to counteract anthropogenic climate change and its impacts. Geoengineering methods focus mainly on increasing the re ‡ectivity of the Earth's surface or atmosphere, and removing GHGs from the atmosphere; they should be di¤erentiated Sunlight re ‡ection methods, also known as solar radiation management (SRM), aim to counteract global warming by reducing the incidence and subsequent absorption of short-wave solar radiation, re ‡ecting a proportion of it back into space. This is achieved by injecting sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere. They are expected to act rapidly once deployed at the appropriate scale, and could potentially reduce surface global temperatures within a few months or years if this were considered desirable (e.g., Crutzen The most compelling arguments in favor of SRM methods are …rst that they can be used as an emergency measure to reduce the global average temperature quickly, and second that they can be used to "buy time" by slowing down the increase in temperature so that new abatement or emission reducing technologies can be developed. On the other hand, there are many arguments against SRM, suggesting that the injection of sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere will induce detrimental e¤ects on plants due to reduced sunlight, ozone depletion, more acid depositions, and less solar radiation available for solar power systems. Furthermore there are additional concerns regarding the inability of engineering methods to adjust regional climate to desired levels. Moreover, if geoengineering is used as a substitute for GHG emission reductions, the acidi…cation of oceans could be intensi…ed (see for example Robock (2008) , Robock et al. (2009) , Jones et al. (2013) ).
Regarding the two main arguments in favor of using SRM -the emergency measure and buying time arguments -it has been argued recently that SRM methods may not be useful in averting global disasters, such as the disintegration of the West Antarctic ice, but it may be tempting to use them in addressing regional environmental emergencies (Barrett et al. 2014 ). Furthermore the buying time argument seems not to be a credible proposal, because it implies that countries will overcome free-rider incentives when SRM is available, while the same countries have been unable to overcome the same incentives at the present time when SRM is not available.
A very important feature of SRM is that, because it is very cheap to deploy, it can be unilaterally used by a country that deems it bene…cial to do so. However although SRM may be bene…cial for a country or group of countries, at the same time it may be harmful for other countries (e.g. by altering the monsoons or increasing ocean acidi…cation). This characteristic suggests that when analyzing SRM incentives and activities in a multi-country framework, much attention should be given to asymmetries among countries because these asymmetries will be very important in determining both the …nal outcome in terms of SRM activities and also the tradeo¤s between mitigation and geoengineering.
The the main contribution of this paper is to study simultaneous mitigation and SRM decisions of individual countries in both a cooperative and a competitive environment when countries are asymmetric. We model mitigation and SRM decisions in the context of cooperative and noncooperative solutions of a di¤erential game with asymmetric players. Earlier results obtained in the context of a symmetric di¤erential game (Manoussi and Xepapadeas 2013) suggest that the presence of geoengineering as a policy option results in a higher level of steady-state accumulation of GHGs emissions than when geoengineering is not an option. 1 This result holds at the cooperative and noncooperative solutions, with relatively stronger incentives for geoengineering at the noncooperative solutions. Higher GHGs could be compatible with lower global temperature, at least in the short run, since geoengineering increases global albedo which tends to reduce temperature. Even if geoengineering leads to a lower temperature, maintaining this temperature requires a constant ‡ow of geoengineering. Thus, if this ‡ow cannot be kept constant at some point in time, there will be a jump in the temperature which will be intensi…ed since the stock of GHGs will already be high.
In this paper, we study a dynamic game of climate change policy design in terms of emissions and geoengineering e¤orts involving two heterogeneous countries. 2 The model we develop consists of a traditional economic bene…t function along with a climate module based on a simpli…ed energy balance climate model (EBCM). EBCMs are based on the idea of global radiative heat balance. In radiative equilibrium the rate at which solar radiation is absorbed matches the rate at which infrared radiation is emitted. The purpose of SRM as a policy instrument is to reduce global average temperature by controlling the incoming solar radiation, thus an EBCM is a useful vehicle for modelling SRM.
We seek to characterize cooperative and noncooperative mitigation (or equivalently GHGs emissions) and SRM strategies in the framework of asymmetric countries. On the modeling side we consider a world consisting of two asymmetric regions or countries with production activities that generate GHG emissions. These GHGs emissions generate private bene…ts (e.g. output) for each country. The stock of GHGs blocks outgoing radiation and causes temperature to increase. Geoengineering in the form of SRM blocks incoming radiation which is expected to cause a drop in temperature. This drop does not, at least in the way that our model is developed, depend on the accumulated GHGs.
We analyze the problem in the context of cooperative solutions and noncooperative solutions associated with a di¤erential game. The analytical framework of di¤erential games has been widely used in the analysis of environmental and resource management problems. This is because these problems are intrinsically dynamic and are characterized by optimizing forwardlooking behavior and by strategic interdependence associated with the actions of economic agents. These characteristics naturally lead to the development of state-space games, in which state variables could be the stock of a pollutant accumulated in the ambient environment (e.g. phosphorous in a lake, or acid bu¤er stocks), the stock of GHGs, or the biomass of a resource. Control variables could be for example emissions, harvesting, R&D expenses, or abatement. 3 We follow this approach here since our problem has all the characteristics that lead to a di¤erential game with the state variable being the stock of GHGs and the control variables being emissions and SRM e¤ort.
In the cooperative case there is coordination between the two countries for the implementation of geoengineering and the level of emissions, as if a global social planner were acting in order to maximize the joint or global welfare. In the noncooperative case, each government chooses SRM and emissions policies noncooperatively. The noncooperative solution is analyzed in terms of feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) strategies. We …rst derive the optimal paths and the steady-state levels of GHG emissions, SRM, global average temperature and GHGs accumulation under the fully symmetric scenario, corresponding to cooperation and feedback Nash strategies. Although this scenario is unlikely to occur in practice, it serves as a useful benchmark against which outcomes corresponding to asymmetric countries can be compared.
We consider asymmetries between countries attributed to two main sources: di¤erences in the impacts of climate change and SRM activities across countries, and di¤erences in the prevailing economic conditions. These di¤erences will shape countries'actions regarding emissions (or mitigation) and SRM.
In particular the …rst source is re ‡ected in heterogeneity between the two 3 See for example Basar and Olsder (1999) .for the theoretical foundations and the survey by Jorgensen et al. (2010) and the references therein. countries in terms of the social cost of geoengineering, which is the harm to a country from SRM activities undertaken by one or both countries and the environmental damages from global warming. The second source refers to heterogeneity related to how productive a country's emissions are in generating private bene…ts, 4 Emissions contribute to the stock of GHGs denoted by G (t) at time t. The evolution of GHGs emitted by both countries is described by the linear di¤erential equation:
where 0 < m < 1 is the natural decay rate of GHGs.
Individual country net private bene…ts, or utility net of environmental externalities, is given by
increasing and convex function of the private cost of geoengineering or SRM
where A 1i ; A 2i are parameters indicating the intercept and the slope of the private marginal bene…ts from emissions which are de…ned as
Thus A 1i can be regarded as re ‡ecting the level e¤ect on marginal bene…ts, while A 2i as re ‡ecting the strength of diminishing returns.
We assume a simple quadratic cost function for the private cost of geo-engineering in each country,
We also assume two types of damage functions related to climate change, which a¤ect private utility. The …rst one re ‡ects damages from the increase in the average global surface temperature because of GHGs emissions. This damage function is represented as usual by a convex, quadratic in our case, function,
where c iT T is the marginal damage cost from a temperature increase for each country.
The second is the social damage function associated with SRM e¤ects, such as for example ocean acidi…cation, increased acid depositions or change in precipitation patterns. 5 Assume that country i undertakes SRM activities i , which will generate total global social damages in both countries
where c j i ; is the social marginal damage cost incurred by country j = 1; 2 from the geoengineering undertaken in country i = 1; 2. 6 5 As mentioned in the introduction, the use of geoengineering methods could intensify ocean acidi…cation. Although the natural absorption of CO2 by the world's oceans helps to mitigate the climatic e¤ects of anthropogenic emissions of CO2, it is believed that since geoengineering will cause an increase in GHG emissions, the resulting decrease in pH will have negative consequences, primarily for oceanic calcifying organisms, and so there will be an impact on marine environments. For a discussion of damage functions related to climate change, see Weitzman (2010) . 6 A situation can be envisioned in which SRM generates extra bene…ts to a country, in addition to those accruing from a decrease in average global temperature, due for example to favorable change in regional climatic conditions. In this case c i could take negative values.
Emissions, SRM and the global temperature
We model climate by a simpli…ed "homogeneous-earth" EBCM (see for example North 1975a , 1975b , 1981 , North et al. 1979 , Coakley 1979 , Coakley and Wielicki 1979 . 7 This approach describes the relation between outgoing infrared radiation I (t) at time t; and the average global surface temperature T (t) (measured in degrees Celsius) at time t. The infrared radiation ‡ux to space I (t) can be represented as a linear function of the surface temperature T (t) by the empirical formula:
where A; B are constants used to relate outgoing infrared radiation to the corresponding surface temperature.
In our model the change in the average global surface temperature T (t)
is determined by the sum of the absorbed solar heating (T 0 ) ; the reduction of incoming radiation due to the aggregate SRM e¤ort (T 1 ) and the increase in the surface temperature due to the emissions of GHGs (T 2 ) which block outgoing radiation,
The term (A + BT ) re ‡ects outgoing radiation; S is the mean annual distribution of radiation; q is the solar constant that includes all types of solar radiation, not just the visible light; is the average albedo of the planet; the function ' ( ) = B P 2 i=1 i is the reduction in solar radiation due to aggregate geoengineering P 2 i=1 i ; > 0 is the sensitivity of incoming radiation to geoengineering in reducing the average global temperature; 8 is a measure of climate's sensitivity; and G; G 0 denote the GHGs, where G is the current accumulation of GHGs and G 0 is the preindustrial accumulation 7 A homogeneous-earth model is a "zero-dimensional" model since it does not contain spatial dimensions but only the temporal dimension. For the use of one-dimensional and two-dimensional EBCMs in climate change economics, see Brock et al. (2013 Brock et al. ( , 2014 . 8 SRM can be regarded as increasing the global albedo, since it blocks incoming radiation. We use a sensitivity function which is linear in aggregate SRM instead of a nonlinear function in order to simplify the exposition.
of GHGs.
We substitute T 0 ; T 1 ; T 2 into (10) to obtain: 9
From equation (9) we have that: a) the average global temperature increases when current accumulation of GHGs is above the preindustrial level because
GHGs block outgoing radiation, and b) the average global temperature decreases when SRM activities manage to reduce incoming radiation.
We assume, following evidence indicating that there is a fast and a slow response of global warming to external forcing with the slow component being relatively small (Held et al. 2010) , that the average global temperature
T converges fast to a steady state relative to the accumulation of GHGs, (G) (see also Brock et al. 2014) . Then this 'quasi steady state'for T can be used to express T as a function of G, as follows:
To simplify the exposition we replace the term B ln 1 +
The global welfare function that could be maximized by some "global social planner" is the unweighted discounted life time utility in each country minus the private cost of geoengineering and the social damages related to the increase in global temperature and to geoengineering. Thus a coopera-tive case is equivalent to having a social planner solving:
; dt subject to (1) and (10) :
Thus the problem of the social planner is to maximize the joint welfare of both countries by choosing paths for emissions E i (t) and geoengineering i (t) subject to the constraints of the accumulation of GHGs and of the average global temperature. A noncooperative case corresponds to a differential game where each country chooses paths for emissions and SRM to maximize own welfare subject to the climate constraints.
Symmetry: The Benchmark Model
As a reference scenario we look at the symmetric outcomes for the cooperative and noncooperative solutions. In this context we determine the steadystate level of emissions, geoengineering, GHGs accumulation and average global temperature under cooperation and noncooperation between the two countries.
Approximations and calibrations
In this section we calibrate the critical parameters of our model in order to provide analytically tractable results regarding the optimal level of emissions and geoengineering in a symmetric-cooperative game. We use approximations for the rest of the parameters of our model.
A possible parameterization is shown in table 1. Values for the parameters S; ; q have been taken from North (1975a North ( , 1975b North ( , 1981 guns, and suspended gas and slurry pipes for the delivery of stratospheric aerosol geoengineering at middle and high altitudes. They conclude that the most cost e¤ective way to deliver material to the stratosphere at million tonnes per year is through the use of existing aircraft or new aircraft designed for the geoengineering mission.
The symmetric cooperative solution
The global social planner's problem is to maximize the joint welfare of both countries by choosing paths for emissions E i (t) and geoengineering i (t) ; subject to the constraints of the accumulation of GHGs and of the average global temperature.
To solve for the cooperative game we formulate the LQ optimal-control problem W = max
; dt , i = 1; 2
Given the LQ structure of the problem, a quadratic value function,
with …rst derivative
is considered. Imposing symmetry so that A 1i = A 1 ; A 2i = A 2 ; c iT = c T ; c i = c ; i = ; the equilibrium must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
Optimality implies that
where E i ; i are, respectively, the optimal cooperative emissions and geo- In this section we analyze the noncooperative symmetric game and characterize its equilibrium outcome. We assume that each country follows feedback strategies regarding the level of emissions and geoengineering e¤orts.
Feedback strategies are associated with the concept of FBNE which is a strong time-consistent noncooperative equilibrium solution (Basar 1989 ).
The FBNE for the LQ climate change game can be obtained as the solution to the dynamic programming representation of the non-cooperative dynamic game.
1 1 Graphs of the optimal paths are available in Appendix A1.
The value function for each country is
We impose symmetry so that A 1i = A 1 ; A 2i = A 2 ; c iT = c T ; c i = c ; i = ; and the corresponding HJB for each country is
where E i ; i are the optimal noncooperative emissions and geoengineering 
Asymmetric Countries and Noncooperative Solutions
In this section we demonstrate that our climate change game admits solution when heterogeneity between the two countries is introduced. We assume that heterogeneity is re ‡ected in the values of the parameters specifying the bene…t and the damage function for each country. This is a natural way to introduce heterogeneity, since we expect countries to di¤er with respect either to their production structure or to the damages that they might suffer from climate change or geoengineering activities. Thus we introduce heterogeneity by considering as the source of asymmetry between the two countries: (i) di¤erences in the level of the social cost of geoengineering (c ),
(ii) di¤erences in the impact of climate change on each country (c T ) ; (iii) di¤erences in the intercept A 1i and the slope A 2i of the marginal bene…t function, and (iv) di¤erences in the level of the rate of time preference ( ) ;
with di¤erences in re ‡ecting di¤erences in the degree of impatience between the two countries. We consider the impact for each potential source 1 2 Graphs are provided in A2.
of heterogeneity alone, except for one case where we combine economic with climatic damage asymmetries. That is, we combine heterogeneity in A 1i
and c in an attempt to explore the attitudes of a relatively more productive country under varying geoengineering social costs.
Our objective is to examine how each source of asymmetry will a¤ect each country's decision about the optimal levels of emissions and SRM, and how this decision will a¤ect the environment in terms of the steady-state level of GHGs and global average temperature. The benchmark for comparisons will be the symmetric non-cooperative optimal (FBNE) level of emissions, geoengineering, GHGs stock and global temperature. 13 In the two-country asymmetric model, an FBNE must satisfy the HJB equations
Each country will take as given the emissions and geoengineering level of the other country and will solve the optimal problem for its own level of emissions and geoengineering following feedback rules which will determine emissions and SRM as time stationary functions of the current concentration of GHGs. In particular given the LQ structure of the problem, we consider two quadratic value functions V i (G) ; i = 1; 2: For each country we have
with …rst derivatives
Thus the HJB equation for country i = 1 is:
Then the HJB satis…es
In a similar way the HJB equation for country i = 2 is 2 V 2 (G) = max
Optimal emissions and geoengineering, and the equation that the HJB equation satis…es, are determined in the same way as for i = 1:
When the feedback rules for each country are replaced in the corresponding HJB equation, then the parameters of the value functions are obtained as usual by equating coe¢ cients of the same power. However, in the asym-metric game, the parameters of the value function for one country, say i;
will depend on the emissions E j and the geoengineering activity j of the other country. This means that in general
, i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j:
The system of equations (16) can be interpreted as the linear best response feedback rule of each country given the stock G. To obtain the equilibrium feedback rules for this asymmetric di¤erential game, …rst we solve for the Nash equilibrium values for geoengineering (j = 1; 2) by solving (14) and its counterpart for 2 simultaneously, second by replacing j (j = 1; 2) into (16) with the appropriate Nash equilibrium value j we obtain the best response feedback rules; and …nally by solving for the Nash equilibrium values E i ; i = 1; 2 in (16) we obtain the linear feedback rules
; i = 1; 2 where^stands for the calculated parameter of the value function. In case of multiple solutions for the parameters of the value function, we choose those that ensure stable dynamics for the stock of GHGs. By replacing the optimal feedback rules in the GHGs dynamics we obtain the steady states and the stable paths for GHGs and global average temperature, along with emissions and geoengineering for each country.
Having obtained the solution, using numerical simulations we examine the impact of heterogeneity by means of sensitivity analysis with respect to the sources of asymmetry discussed above. The values of the parameters used in the calibration of the symmetric cooperative problem are used as the central values for the sensitivity analysis. In particular we consider two di¤erent scenarios for heterogeneity.
In the …rst, which can be regarded as a case of "symmetric heterogeneity", we consider an increase of 20%, 40%, 70% or 90% in the value of the speci…c parameter for country 1 with a corresponding decrease in the same parameter for country 2. These scenarios will be denoted by 20%; 40%; 70%; 90%:
In the second scenario, which is the case of "asymmetric heterogeneity,"
we consider a given change, positive or negative in the parameter for country 1, and an opposite but di¤erent change in value in the same parameter for country 2. In particular we consider the following changes for the second scenario, with the …rst number in each pair denoting country 1. For exam-ple (+20%& 90%), (+20%& 70%), means that the speci…c parameter increases 20% from its central value for country 1, and the same parameter is reduced by 90% in one run and by 70% in another run for country 2. 14 Using this type of approach we hope to capture the e¤ect of both symmetric and asymmetric di¤erences between the two countries.
Heterogeneity in the social cost of geoengineering (c )
We assume …rst that the implementation of geoengineering has a di¤erent impact on each country in terms of the social cost of geoengineering, which is the cost with which each society will be burdened due to the implementation of geoengineering by itself and/or the other country.
The central value of the social marginal damage cost from geoengineering is set at 3 10 9 $=(GtC) 2 and symmetric and asymmetric deviations as described above are considered. The results are shown in table 2. For the symmetric deviations we observe that both countries increase emissions, but most importantly country 2 (column i = 2), which experiences the lower social geoengineering costs, increases geoengineering a lot more than the reductions of country 1, which experiences the higher geoengineering social costs. The net increase in geoengineering increases the steady-state stock of GHGs. In the case of asymmetric deviation the pattern is very similar.
We need a very large increase in the social cost of geoengineering, +90%
or +70% in country 2 relative to a corresponding decrease in country 1 ( 20%), in order to have a relatively larger reduction in the geoengineering from country 2. In general increased emissions and SRM lead to an increase in the majority of cases of the steady-state stock of GHGs, while there is a corresponding moderate decrease in global average temperature. Thus the di¤erence in the social cost of geoengineering might lead to lower global temperature but higher stock of GHGs relative to the symmetric case. 
Heterogeneity in environmental damages due to global warming (c T )
We assume that climate change in terms of increased global average temperature has a di¤erent impact on each country expressed in di¤erences in the term c T among the two countries. For the purposes of the sensitivity analysis, the central value for c T was set at 22:183 10 9 $=(GtC) 2 , which is the value used in the cooperative solution, and the symmetric and asymmetric deviations described above are considered. The results are shown in table 3. In the case of symmetric deviations the behavior of each county is also symmetric and in the opposite direction, so that the …nal outcome on GHGs and average global temperature is zero. In the case of asymmetric deviations, the country that experiences the smaller damages increases emissions relatively more and reduces geoengineering relatively less than the emission reductions and geoengineering increases in the country that experiences higher damages (e.g., see rows +20%; 90% ; +40%; 90%). The country that experiences the higher damages increases geoengineering more and reduces emissions more than the geoengineering reductions and the emissions increases undertaken by the country experiencing lower damages (e.g., see rows 20%; +90% ; 40%; +90%). A strong reduction in damages in one of the countries will eventually lead to a substantial increase in the steady-state GHGs and global average temperature. The country that experiences relatively low damages from global warming will tend to increase emissions and reduce geoengineering. If the reduction in damages in one country dominates the increase in the other, steady-state GHGs and global temperature will increase. We assume that each country has a di¤erent intercept of the marginal private bene…ts from its own emissions. This means that the marginal bene…t function of one country is uniformly above the other, suggesting that for this country emissions are more productive in terms of private bene…ts. We perform sensitivity analysis by setting that central value for A 1 at 224:26 ($=tC) (Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas 2012). The results are shown in table 4. In the case of symmetric deviations, the behavior of each county is also symmetric and in the opposite direction, so that the …nal outcome on GHGs and average global temperature is zero. In the case of asymmetric deviations, if the increase in emission productivity dominates (e.g., see rows 20%; +90% ; 40%; +90%), then there is an overall increase in emissions, geoengineering, steady-state GHGs and global temperature. We have the opposite result when the reduction in emission productivity dominates.
Thus, as expected, the country with the higher marginal bene…ts from production/emissions will raise its emissions relative to the symmetric game and the country with low marginal bene…ts from production will reduce the emissions. Another result is that both countries seem to reduce geoengineering e¤orts by the same proportion relative to the symmetric game when the reduction in productivity dominates (e.g. row +20%; 90%) and increase geoengineering e¤ort when the increase in productivity dominates (e.g. row 20%; +90%). This behavior could be explained by the fact that the parameter of asymmetry between the two countries a¤ects emissions only, and thus both countries follow the same policy for their geoengineering e¤orts despite the di¤erence in bene…ts from emissions. This result suggests that, in the context of the noncooperative solution for the LQ model, an upward shift in the marginal bene…ts from emissions of a country will eventually lead to relatively higher stocks of GHGs and global temperature. We assume that each country has a di¤erent slope of the marginal bene…ts from emissions A 2 . Given the quadratic structure of the bene…t function from emissions, the country with the higher slope is characterized by stronger diminishing returns in the generation of bene…ts from emissions.
We perform sensitivity analysis using A 2 1:9212 10 9 $=(GtC) 2 as the central value for the parameter (see Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas 2012) .
The results are shown in 
Heterogeneity in the rate of impatience ( )
We assume that each country discounts future net bene…ts at a di¤erent rate, which implies a di¤erent degree of impatience between the two countries, with current net bene…ts being the undiscounted lifetime utility in each country minus the private cost of geoengineering and the social damages related to the increase in global temperature and to geoengineering. We associate discount rates 1 and 2 with the HJB equation for each country and solve the asymmetric di¤erential game in the manner described earlier in section 4.
For the purposes of the sensitivity analysis, we consider a central value of 0.03, which was used in the symmetric game, for the discount rate and then consider deviations from this central value. We assume that country 1 will have a constantly lower rate of time preference than country 2. Thus country 2 is more impatient than country 1. The results are shown in table 6 . As expected, the more impatient country (the high country) increases emissions and the less impatient country (low country) reduces emissions.
It is important to note that the …nal outcome for the global environment depends on both the di¤erence between the discount rates -the impatience gap -and the level of impatience in each country. In the …rst seven rows of proved. This is not the case however; private bene…ts from more productive emissions outweigh any gains in social bene…ts that reduced emissions, due to higher productivity, might have generated since social bene…ts have public good characteristics. Furthermore, the e¤ect of productivity gaps on geoengineering behavior is not substantial. It seems that when the more productive country dominates, there is a moderate increase in SRM activities. This is explained by the fact that when emissions increase a lot as a result of the productivity gap, countries might increase SRM activities to counterbalance the global warming e¤ects of increased emissions.
Finally if one country is more productive in generating private bene…ts from emissions and the other country su¤ers relatively less social cost from SRM, the …nal outcome will be an increase in global emissions, SRM activities, the steady-state stock of GHGs and the average global temperature.
Thus, we examined two major types of asymmetries among countries.
The …rst relates to climatic damages, that is damages to a country from global SRM, or from an increase in the global temperature. Focusing on the situation where the asymmetry is substantial, the results suggest that in the …rst case both SRM activities and emission increase, while in the second case we have the opposite result -mitigation (i.e. emission reduction) and SRM increases. These results could but comparable to those obtained by Moreno- Given that in the real world asymmetries among countries in climatic damages, economic conditions and impatience rates are expected to be present and most likely substantial, this type of conceptual framework might be useful in climate economics.
It should be noted that the most striking results are obtained when countries deviate asymmetrically from the benchmark (the symmetric solution).
If the deviations are symmetric in the sense, for example, that the amount by which the cost of global warming in one country is below the benchmark is the same in absolute value as the amount by which the cost of global warming is higher than the benchmark in the other, then the symmetric and the asymmetric solutions do not di¤er much. Under asymmetric deviations, however, we have substantial deviations from the benchmark solution.
Another result is that in the noncooperative solution, a tradeo¤ between emissions and SRM appears only in certain cases. In fact, in cases that are likely to be encountered in the real world, a country has an incentive to increase emissions in order to capture private bene…ts and increase SRM in order to counterbalance the e¤ects of increased emissions on global temperature. These e¤ects become stronger the less the social cost of SRM to the country, the higher the private productivity of emissions and the lower the 
